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Between the Clinic and the Laboratory:
Ethology and Pharmacology in the Work of Michael
Robin Alexander Chance, c.1946–1964
ROBERT G W KIRK*
Whilst ethology has garnered the attention of historians of science, particularly those
interested in the biological and behavioural sciences, historians of medicine have yet
to explore ethology’s medical significance. Ethology, “the biological study of
behaviour”, is historically associated with the work of Nikolaas Tinbergen and Konrad
Lorenz, who, alongside Karl von Frisch, were awarded the Nobel Prize for Physiology
or Medicine in 1973 for their research into the “organization and elicitation of individual
and social behaviour patterns”.
1 This particular award is notable as it was the first to be
given in part recognition of the establishment of a discipline rather than for a specific
discovery or advance.
2 This award was also provocative as it was the first to recognize
non-reductionist behavioural research.
3 Prior to 1973, otherwise renowned psychologists
including Wilhelm Wundt, Sigmund Freud, and Carl Jung had failed to gain recognition,
whereas some behavioural physiologists were awarded the Nobel Prize, for example Ivan
Petrovich Pavlov in 1904. Historians of medicine should be interested in ethology as
the 1973 prize recognized that ethological research had “led to important results for,
e.g. psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine, especially as regards possible means of
adapting environment to the biological equipment of man with the aim of preventing
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1P Marler and D R Griffin, ‘The 1973 Nobel
Prize for Physiology or Medicine’, Science, 1973,
182: 464–6. The most comprehensive historical
account of ethology to date remains R W Burkhardt,
Patterns of behavior: Konrad Lorenz, Niko
Tinbergen, and the founding of ethology, University
of Chicago Press, 2005. Burkhardt adopts a largely
biographical frame focused on Tinbergen and Lorenz.
2D A Dewsbury, ‘The 1973 Nobel Prize for
physiology or medicine: recognition for behavioral
science?’, Am. Psychol., 2003, 58: 747–52.
3L T Benjamin Jr., ‘Behavioral science and the
Nobel Prize: a history’, Am. Psychol., 2003, 58:
731–41. The award was also controversial due to
Lorenz’s association with Nazi ideology, see
Theodora J Kalikow, ‘Konrad Lorenz’s ethological
theory: explanation and ideology, 1938–1943’,
J. Hist. Biol., 1983, 16: 39–73; cf. Robert J Richards,
Darwin and the emergence of evolutionary theories of
mind and behavior, University of Chicago Press,
1987, p. 536.
513maladaptation and disease”.
4 This paper explores the relevance of ethology to the devel-
opment of the clinical and biomedical sciences in post-Second World War Britain. In
doing so it engages and extends Richard Burkhardt’s metaphorical use of ecology to
describe ethology as characterized by interactivity, a responsiveness to contingency,
and a willingness to evolve and adapt to a diverse number of “ecological” niches. The
paper also continues Burkhardt’s biographical approach to ethology’s history by focusing
on a single figure, the comparatively little known pharmacologist and ethologist Michael
Robin Alexander Chance (1915–2000). It contends that medicine formed a hitherto
unrecognized example of “ethology’s ecologies”.
5
Michael Chance could be described as a marginal figure to the history of medicine; his
work did not have the broad influence that would have made him of obvious historical
interest. Moreover, Chance existed on the borders of so many sub-disciplines that it is
difficult to identify who should be interested in his work. Employed as a pharmacologist,
yet identifying himself as an ethologist, Chance’s research interweaved the fields of
pharmacology, physiology, endocrinology, ethology, animal husbandry, psychiatry,
anthropology, and sociology, amongst others. Spatially, and practically, Chance’s work
found application in locations as diverse as the material practices of laboratory science
and the education in clinical observation of medical students. Adequately historicizing
the diversity of Chance’s oeuvre would be a major undertaking beyond the bounds of
a single article. Consequently analysis is here restricted to how he integrated ethology
within laboratory science in order to reveal the “social” nature of laboratory animals.
In the 1940s Chance turned to ethology as a means to study how social behaviour altered
laboratory animal responses and undermined their experimental reliability.
6 His work
was no less instrumental in orientation than, say, the genetic standardization of mice
undertaken by C C Little.
7 Chance saw the animal as a tool, but, none the less, empha-
sized the “nature” of the laboratory animal as a living being with social relations, rela-
tions that included that between animal and human.
The paper begins by outlining how Chance first encountered the “social” laboratory
animal during his pharmaceutical work at Glaxo Laboratories. In order to contextualize
his work within the culture and politics of the period, the origins of his interest in etho-
logy are then traced, but not to animal behaviour. Chance’s ethological interests are
shown to have developed during his time at the Pioneer Health Centre, Peckham; thus
he first learnt of ethology in the study of human health. Relocating the origins of
Chance’s ethology from the animal to the human geographically repositions his work
4Karolinska Institutet, ‘Press release: The Nobel
Prize in Physiology or Medicine’, 1973, http://
nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/medicine/laureates/1973/
press.html (accessed 31 March 2009).
5The term is Burkhardt’s, see Burkhardt, op. cit.,
note 1 above, esp. pp. 447–84.
6There is a growing literature on the
standardization of laboratory organisms, see, for
example, Adele E Clarke and Joan H Fujimura, The
right tools for the job: at work in twentieth-century
life sciences, Princeton University Press, 1992;
Bonnie Tocher Clause, ‘The Wistar rat as a right
choice: establishing mammalian standards and the
ideal of a standardized mammal’, J. Hist. Biol., 1993,
26: 329–49; Robert E Kohler, Lords of the fly:
Drosophila genetics and the experimental life,
University of Chicago Press, 1994; Angela N H
Creager, The life of a virus: tobacco mosaic virus as
an experimental model, 1930–1965, University of
Chicago Press, 2002; Karen A Rader, Making mice:
standardizing animals for American biomedical
research, 1900–1955, Princeton University Press,
2004.
7On Little and genetic standardization, see Rader,
ibid.
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514away from the laboratory (an unusual place for ethology to be practised) to the clinic.
The importance of ethology to Chance’s experimental science is then explored, with par-
ticular focus upon how ethology imbued the laboratory animal with subjective “natural”
characteristics, feelings, and needs. Consequently, Chance reconfigured the relationship
between experimenter and experimental animal as one based on mutual obligation and
co-operation. This is shown to have opened up a new territory within which the explicit
recognition of an ethical relationship between researcher and laboratory animal became a
necessary part of experimental practice. Accordingly, this paper argues not only that
ethology operated within the laboratory despite its widespread association with the field,
but also that it served as a vector by which other factors conventionally seen as being
outside the laboratory became integrated within its material practices. Such factors
included clinical observation and the consideration of animal welfare, both of which
have been seen as extrinsic to, as opposed to integral to, the practices of laboratory
science.
8
Biological Standardization and the “Social” Laboratory Animal
During the Second World War the British War Office sought to utilize drugs such as
amphetamine and benzedrine sulphate in order to keep personnel operational for longer
periods of time.
9 The effective assessment of such drugs was hampered by difficulties in
developing reliable methods of their measurement (or “standardization”).
10 Inconstancies
in the standardization of biological substances of this type were common; a 1942 survey
article found that independent reports from different laboratories of the lethal dose of
benzedrine sulphate in white mice varied by a factor of ten.
11 Even the leading figures
of the discipline of biological standardization admitted that its methodology was all
too often “a subject for amusement or despair, rather than for satisfaction or self-
respect”.
12 Biological standardization had emerged in the inter-war period in reaction
to the flood of new substances, including antitoxins, vitamins and hormones, which
8For example, the history of ethical aspects of
animal experimentation focus entirely upon the
“antivivisectionist controversy”, see Richard D
French, Making mice in Victorian Society, Princeton
University Press, 1975; Nicolaas A Rupke (ed.),
Vivisection in historical perspective, London,
Routledge, 1990; A-H Maehle, ‘The ethical discourse
on animal experimentation 1650–1900’, in Andrew
Wear, Johanna Geyer-Kordesch and Roger French
(eds), Doctors and ethics: the earlier historical
setting of professional ethics, Amsterdam, Rodopi,
1993, pp. 203–51. The result of this is to reify the
presumption that the laboratory is devoid of emotion
or moral thought, a presumption that has been shown
to be false in a number of ways, see the literature in
note 6 above, and note 13 below, for examples.
Nevertheless, social histories of antivivisection and
scientific histories of the laboratory rarely interact.
Consequently there has been no historical analysis of
the role of animal welfare in the material practice of
animal dependent laboratory science. This article
forms an initial foray into such a study, funded by the
Wellcome Trust, grant number 084988, and titled
‘Managing morals: animal experiment and animal
welfare in Britain c.1947–1986’.
9R C Browne, ‘Amphetamine in the Air Force’,
Br. J. Addiction, 1947, 44: 64–70.
10M R A Chance, ‘Population size and variation
in small populations’, Proc. R. Soc. Med., 1964,
57: 174.
11BG u ¨nther, ‘Toxicity of benzedrine sulfate in
the white mouse and in the frog’, J. Pharmacol. Exp.
Ther., 1942, 76: 375–7.
12J H Burn, ‘The errors of biological assay’,
Physiol. Rev., 1930, 10: 146–69, p. 146. For a history
of biological standardization as a discipline, see
A F Bristow, T Barrowcliffe and D R Bangham,
‘Standardization of biological medicines: the first
hundred years, 1900–2000’, Notes Rec. R. Soc., 2006,
60: 271–89.
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515were discovered during the early twentieth century but could not yet be chemically mea-
sured. It promised to be an important new field that would develop reliable methods to
standardize biological substances, but its task was an impossible one. So-called
“biologicals” could be measured only by their effect upon living organisms, yet indivi-
dual organisms were found to be too variable to serve as reliable diagnostic tools. The
conventional route toward overcoming natural variation was that of statistical science
which demanded ever larger groups of organisms (usually mice, guinea-pigs, rats and
rabbits) be used in an attempt to increase accuracy toward the reliability that a chemist’s
thermometer measured heat.
Recognition of animal variation, that the animal was not simply a machine, occurred
at different times and in different contexts throughout twentieth-century biomedical
science. For example, O E Dror has illustrated how inter-war physiologists recognized
(and subsequently mechanized) emotion as a source of unpredictable variance in the
laboratory.
13 Importantly, the pharmaceutical use of animals differed from their use in
physiology. In the latter the animal was both the subject and the object of knowledge.
The physiological functions of the animal body formed the area of study, whilst the
body itself was the means to that end. In pharmacology, and in particular the field of bio-
logical standardization, the subject of knowledge was biochemical substances and the
animal served as no more than a purportedly objective diagnostic technology. There
was, therefore, embedded in the pharmaceutical use of animals, an elision between the
instrumental purpose to which animals were used and how they were conceived. The
one mutually reinforced the presupposition of the other, both being further sustained
by a lack of interest or expertise in the subject of animal behavioural physiology. This
goes some way to explaining why Dror has found that, despite the careful mechanization
of emotion in the inter-war period, the animals that physiologists worked with “were not
perceived or handled as tools or instruments”.
14 In contrast the pharmaceutical sciences
used the animal as a measuring device that had to be, and so was all too often presumed
to be, a mechanistically reliable tool.
Michael Chance graduated from University College London in 1937 with a degree in
zoology, and, having spent six months working on the biological assay of pituitary hor-
mones under Alan Parkes at the National Institute for Medical Research, joined Glaxo
Laboratories as a pharmacologist in 1938.
15 Perhaps from the start, Chance saw conflicts
between his zoological knowledge of animals as living organisms and the presumptions
regarding their use in pharmacology. At Glaxo he worked under the direction of the bio-
chemist Alfred Louis Bacharach, who was among the first in Britain to advocate inbred
animals as standardized laboratory tools, or “the litmus paper of the vitamin chemist”.
16
Yet despite being used as reliable reagents akin to litmus paper, animals did not behave
13O E Dror, ‘The affect of experiment. The turn
to emotions in Anglo-American physiology,
1900–1940’, Isis, 1999, 90: 205–37. For variation as a
productive force, see Daniel P Todes, ‘Pavlov’s
physiology factory’, Isis, 1997, 88: 205–46.
14Dror, ibid., p. 237, n. 98.
15Chance began work with laboratory animals on
11 October 1937, being granted a Home Office
licence for the “administration of hormonal
substances to normal animals and to those from which
various glands have been removed”. See National
Archives, Kew (hereafter NA) HO 45/23629.
16A L Bacharach, ‘The albino rat in biochemical
investigation’, Pharmaceutical J. and Pharmacist,
1926, 62: 629–30.
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516as reliable reagents. A minority who were willing to approach the animal as being more
than a diagnostic tool had argued that animal physiology varied both between individuals
and over the seasons.
17 Moreover, not all laboratories had access to inbred animals,
which had led in the 1940s to growing demands for the establishment of a national
supply of genetically and pathogenically “standardized” laboratory animals in post-war
Britain. Bacharach was a leading agitator in this movement, and was responsible for
the Association of Scientific Workers’ wartime campaign to persuade the Medical
Research Council (MRC) to accept responsibility for the regulation (if not provision)
of laboratory animal production.
18
When asked by the War Office in 1942 to measure the potency of stimulants such as
amphetamine, Chance therefore had a wealth of expertise, not to mention standardized ani-
m a l s ,t od r a wu p o na tG l a x o .
19 However, he demonstrated little interest in inbreeding as a
means to standardize laboratory animals (and thus the results thereby obtained by their
use) as advocated by Bacharach. Instead, he focused on a singular observation reported in
1940 by J A Gunn and M R Gurd (of the Nuffield Institute for Medical Research, Oxford)
to explain the difficulties in developing a reliable means to measure amphetamine. In their
investigation of adrenaline Gunn and Gurd had noted that “symptoms of excitement are
much more pronounced if several injected animals are kept together ...If one animal is
keptalone ina jar,noverystrikingsymptomsofexcitementmaybeexhibited”.
20The impli-
cation, though they did not state so explicitly, was that social interaction had physiological
consequences. Thus rather than follow Bacharach (and the vast majority of researchers
across the biomedical sciences concerned with standardizing animals) in turning to genetics
toexplainirreconcilableexperimentalresults,Chanceprioritizedsocialinterrelationasmed-
iating the behavioural and physiological responses of animals. This choice shaped the
entirety of his subsequent career, and anticipated important developments in post-war
laboratory animal use across the biomedical sciences.
Careful observation of the effects of aggregation demonstrated that the presence of
other mice was found to double the toxicity of amphetamine. This observation opened
up a new discourse that prioritized the social to explain the difficulties hitherto experi-
enced in biological standardization. The comparative uniqueness of Chance’s approach
is revealed when his first paper of 1946 is considered against others in the Journal
of Pharmacology. Chance’s paper is unusual in containing detailed accounts of the
behavioural repertoire of amphetamine-dosed mice. He began by describing how a soli-
tary “benzedrinized” mouse entered into an alternating sequence of spontaneous rapid
movement and squeaking followed by periods of stillness where the mouse maintained
17For example, J W Trevan, ‘The error of
determination of toxicity’, Proc. R. Soc., 1927,
101B: 483–514.
18See R G W Kirk, ‘“Wanted—standard guinea
pigs”: standardization and the experimental animal
market in Britain ca.1919–1947’, Stud. Hist. Philos.
Biol. Biomed. Sci., 2008, 39: 280–91. In contrast, the
American demand for standardized organisms has
been related to genetic and cancer research. See, for
example, Kohler, and Rader, both op. cit., note 6
above.
19At Glaxo, Chance became the first person to be
licensed to conduct “severe and novel” experiments
on animals in a commercial laboratory, see
NA HO45/23629, ‘Advisory Committee on the
administration of the Cruelty to Animals Act’.
20J A Gunn and M R Gurd, ‘The action of
some amines related to adrenaline. Cyclohexyl-
alkylamines’, J. Physiol., 1940, 97: 453–70, p. 457.
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517unusual rigidity and alertness but at all times remained close to the wall of its box with
eyes looking upwards. Chance interpreted such behaviour as being generally
“apprehensive”.
21 This abnormal behaviour was found to be exaggerated in groups, mov-
ing through three distinct forms of interaction. In the first, each mouse exhibited sponta-
neous squeaking and quick movement about the box, avoiding all encounters with others.
After fifteen to thirty minutes the second phase began which saw mice begin to react to
random squeaks by jumping in the air. Random encounters in this way at first caused
“fright”, where one mouse evaded the other by jumping or running away. Eventually
such encounters led to pairing, where mice reared on their hind legs with fore-paws
raised and heads swaying in unison, a position Chance labelled a “defensive encounter”.
This behaviour became synchronized, with the group alternating between rapid move-
ment and “escape reactions”, followed by periods where mice paired and swayed silently
until a random noise initiated a new period of jumping and evasion. The final stage of
behaviour was marked by aggressive encounters where mice attacked one another,
with some falling into fatal convulsions. This detailed observational description of
laboratory animal behaviour was unusual in a pharmacological paper, where convention-
ally the only behavioural observation noted was death. Chance speculated that the num-
ber of encounters between mice somehow catalysed the drug’s effect upon the central
nervous system. His findings were of pharmaceutical importance because if the toxicity
of a drug altered in accordance with the degree of aggregation, the latter would have to
become a fundamental consideration in experimental design. Genetic standardization
would need to be extended to include the standardization of social interactions if a reliable
laboratory animal were to be constructed for pharmaceutical experimentation. In subse-
quent decades the interaction of pharmaceutical drugs and social behaviour became a
growing concern as psychotropic drugs came to prominence, giving birth to new sub-
disciplines such as psychopharmacology and psychopharmacogenetics. Chance’s work
influenced the formation of these fields and the behavioural analysis he developed came
to be recognized as an important, albeit problematic, tool of psychopharmacology.
22
Chance’s identification of the social behaviour of laboratory animals was of instru-
mental importance not only to pharmacology. It was equally of relevance to the emer-
ging study of animal behaviour known as ethology. Consequently, Chance published
the same paper with minimal alterations in two journals for distinct audiences, the Jour-
nal of Pharmacology and Behaviour. Instigated in 1946 by the Dutch ethologist Nikolaas
Tinbergen, who was soon to join Oxford from Leiden, Behaviour boasted as editors well
known (or shortly to be so) names including the Cambridge ethologist W H Thorpe, the
Swiss zoologist Heini Hediger, and the American psychobiologist Frank Beach (the latter
enrolled to provide representation from across the Atlantic for what some saw as the new
21M R A Chance, ‘Aggregation as a factor
influencing the toxicity of sympathomimetic amines
in mice’, J. Pharmacol. Exptl. Therap., 1946, 87:
214–19, p. 217.
22For Chance’s contribution to
psychopharmacology, see C R B Joyce (ed.),
Psychopharmacology: dimensions and perspectives,
London, Tavistock Publications, 1968, esp.
pp. 283–318; L L Iversen, Susan D Iversen and
Solomon H Snyder (eds), Handbook of
psychopharmacology, 16 vols, New York, Plenum
Press, 1977, vol. 7, esp. pp. 3–35. For
psychopharmacogentics, see P L Broadhurst, Drugs
and the inheritance of behavior, New York, Plenum
Press, 1978. For the history of psychopharmacology,
see David Healy, The creation of psycho-
pharmacology, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press, 2002.
Robert G W Kirk
518“European” science of animal behaviour).
23 Chance’s paper on laboratory animal social
behaviour formed the fourth of fourteen, appearing alongside articles by Tinbergen,
Hediger, and Johan Bierens de Haan, all familiar names in the history of animal beha-
vioural research. That Chance published his observations of laboratory animal behaviour
in the inaugural volume of Behaviour is significant. On one level, it is indicative of his
growing interest in the ethological analysis of animal behaviour. More crucially, the fact
that Chance’s observations of benzedrinized mice appeared in what was a new interna-
tional journal intended to serve as the platform for the science of ethology demonstrates
laboratory sciences’ hitherto unrecognized significance to this emerging field.
24 Through
the 1950s Chance continued to develop his interest in the sociology of laboratory ani-
mals, adapting the principles of ethology to address the ecology and behavioural needs
of laboratory animals. At the same time he began ethological studies of the social struc-
ture of primates, activities that became a source of some conflict with his university as
they appeared unrelated to his role as lecturer in pharmacology. From the late 1950s
Chance began a long campaign to be officially regarded as an ethologist, which led in
1966 to his reappointment as reader in ethology on condition he continued to teach
pharmacology in the Medical School.
25 The fact that Chance came to ethology as a phar-
macologist after having chosen to focus on laboratory animal social behaviour raises the
question of why he pursued this route. His interest in the ethological analysis of animal
behaviour might appear explicable with reference to his undergraduate zoological back-
ground, as might his subsequent interest in primate social structure and its evolutionary
significance to human behaviour.
26 Yet, prior to his interest in the ethological approach
to animal behaviour there was every reason, given the influence of Bacharach at
Glaxo, for him to have adopted the conventional genetic route to the standardization of
laboratory animals as opposed to speculating on the social. What, then, was it that led
Chance to focus on social behaviour as an explanation for the variability of laboratory
animals?
Human Ethology and the Pioneer Health Centre
The social basis of relations within society was much debated in Second World War
Britain in anticipation of the post-war egalitarian reconstruction of the country. Chance,
being a committed socialist and active Labour Party member, participated in this debate
as a member of the Socialist Clarity Group responsible for publishing Labour Discussion
Notes, a bi-monthly publication aimed at encouraging socialist thinking among the work-
ing class. In the post-war period Chance’s ethological analysis of social structure was
orientated towards explaining the rise of Nazism as a social pathology, and demonstrated
a concern with the cause and prevention of fascism and the shaping of a healthy
23Tinbergen began publicizing Behaviour
in 1946, the first issue was not published until
1948.
24M R A Chance, ‘A peculiar form of social
behaviour induced in mice by amphetamine’,
Behaviour, 1948, 1: 64–70.
25See Faculty handbooks 1965/66 and 1966,
Archives of the University of Birmingham, University
of Birmingham, UK.
26See, for example, M R A Chance and C J Jolly,
Social groups of monkeys, apes and men, London,
Cape, 1970.
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519society.
27 His analysis of social structure was built on the supposition that fascism was a
social pathology, a mass-neurosis, with its origins in humanity’s evolutionary past.
28
Arguably Chance’s political interests in this sense shaped his science.
29 However,
Bacharach too was a committed and active socialist but he advocated genetic standardi-
zation as the means to produce reliable laboratory animals. Whilst political concerns
sustained Chance’s interest in the social behaviour of animals, therefore, they can
not be said to have alone determined the origins of this predisposition. In fact it was
at the Pioneer Health Centre, Peckham, that Chance first encountered the idea that
social relations were central to physiological well being. He worked as director of
the laboratory at the Pioneer Health Centre between leaving Glaxo in May and joining
Birmingham in September 1946.
30 It was at Peckham that he learnt of ethology as a
methodological approach to the study of the complexity of socio-physiological rela-
tions, an experience that fundamentally altered his thought and shaped the entirety
of his future career.
The Pioneer Health Centre was established by George Scott Williamson, a pathologist
at the Royal Free Hospital, and Innes Hope Pearse, House Physician at the London Hos-
pital, in 1926.
31 Believing that modern urban living was not conducive to the promotion
of health, and that the medical profession was “content with palliation as its highest
goal”, Scott Williamson and Pearse sought to pioneer a new approach to health based
on the concept that the “power of the environment may yet be potent to save the
individual” from the threat of urban living.
32 Their approach differed from mainstream
medicine in that it sought to investigate “health” as opposed to “disease”, with health
conceived as a relational process emerging from the synthesis of organism and environ-
ment, and not simply a desirable yet fixed “state”. In their evocatively titled Biologists in
search of material, Scott Williamson and Pearse argued that medicine, as much as bio-
logical disciplines such as physiology and pathology, was incapable of revealing any-
thing about the healthy organism. These disciplines were dependent upon an
experimental methodology which, “conditioning the environment to secure a specific
effect”, inevitably led to the “emasculation of the organism”. In any case, biology should
not be the study of “the organism on the defensive ...running away from living so as to
ensure survival” (as medicine studied disease) but rather the study of the “organism
27In the 1960s Chance was a member of the
Centre for Research in Collective Psychopathology
at the University of Sussex, an interdisciplinary
group that sought to explain Fascism as a mass-
psychosis.
28See, for example, M R A Chance, ‘What makes
monkeys sociable’, New Scientist, 5 March 1959,
pp. 520–3, where Chance suggests that Germany’s
decision to “line up behind an intimidating leader”
had a “strong instinctive component” (p. 523).
29For the Left and science, see Gary Werskey,
The visible college: a collective biography of British
scientists and socialists of the 1930s, London, Free
Association Books, 1988.
30Letter from M R A Chance to the Editor of
Radio Times, 11 Nov. 1995. M R A Chance Papers, in
the care of Dave Stevens, London (hereafter MRAC).
31See J Lewis and B Brookes, ‘The Peckham
health Centre, “PEP”, and the concept of general
practice during the 1930s and 1940s’, Med. Hist.,
1983, 27: 151–61; J Lewis and B Brookes, ‘A
reassessment of the work of the Peckham Health
Centre, 1926–1951’, Milbank Memorial Fund
Quarterly–Health and Society, 1983, 61: 307–50.
32I H Pearse and G Scott Williamson, The case for
action: a survey of everyday life under modern
industrial conditions, with special reference to the
question ofhealth, London,Faber and Faber,1931, p.5.
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520actively embracing the environment, i.e. in health”.
33 In 1946 Scott Williamson distin-
guished the Peckham approach arguing:
The medical approach is essentially one derived from the study of pathology. The Peckham
approach—the determination of what is right with the family and its personnel and home—is
derived from the other branch of biology not previously differentiated, and for which hitherto there
has been neither name nor technical procedure. Let us call this branch of biology—ethology ...
The systematic study of pathos of the people, or pathology, has proved its worth; but the best
that can be made of a bad job with it is to stop the bad from getting worse.
In the Peckham Health Centre we have begun the study of the ethos of the people, and have
made a first tentative technological approach to their ecology ... any centre dealing with the
pathology of a patient ...can have not the slightest resemblance in practice to a health centre deal-
ing with the ethology and ecology of the family.
34
In referencing “family” and “ecology” as key to the Peckham approach, Scott
Williamson indicated that health was to be understood to derive from physical and social
environmental relations conceptualized holistically not reductively.
35 Of interest is the
philosophical and entomological reasoning that led Scott Williamson to claim ethology
as the methodology of the “Peckham approach”. The term developed from an entomolo-
gical contrast with the root of pathology, “pathos”, suggesting the contrast of ethos, or
character, and thus “ethology”. Scott Williamson thereby arrived at the point J S Mill
had first visited a century earlier in positing ethology as a “science of character”.
36
The genealogy of Scott Williamson’s ethology is quite distinct from that of the animal
behavioural ethology associated with Tinbergen and Lorenz. Nevertheless, the material
practices and philosophical presuppositions of both closely resonate with one another.
The Pioneer Health Centre was imagined as a “laboratory” wherein the relationship
between the individual and the environment could be experimentally explored whilst cir-
cumventing the perceived problem of the act of observation altering the observed.
37
Membership of the Centre was open only to families and not individuals, as the family
was considered by Scott Williamson to be the basic unit of life.
38 The internal social
relations of the family as well as its interaction with the physical and social environment
of the community were the subject of study; “the laboratory of the biologist” was to be
“in the field of the leisure of the family”.
39 The Health Centre, therefore, served as
a community centre in which families would cultivate their health whilst pursuing
leisure activities. Swimming pools, recreation rooms, a gymnasium, library, a children’s
33I H Pearse and G Scott Williamson, Biologists
in search of material, London, Faber and Faber, 1938,
pp. 18–19.
34G Scott Williamson, ‘Peckham, the first health
centre’, Lancet, 1946, i: 393–5, pp. 393–4.
35The Pioneer Health Centre should be viewed
as a component part of a wider holistic movement
that existed in the inter-war period which
consciously identified itself in contrast to more
reductive, biomedical sciences, see C Lawrence and
GW e i s z ,Greater than the parts: holism in
biomedicine 1920–1950, Oxford University Press,
1998.
36J S Mill, A system of logic, London, Longmans,
1879 [1843], bk 6, ch. 5, Section 4, p. 457.
37I H Pearse and L H Crocker, The Peckham
experiment: a study in the living structure of society,
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1943, p. 20.
38Ibid., p. 43.
39G Scott Williamson, ‘The biological
significance of the family’, Social Service Review,
July 1932, Pioneer Health Centre, Peckham, with
papers of George Scott Williamson MD (1884–1953)
and Innes Hope Pearse (1889–1978) Archives and
Manuscripts Collection, Wellcome Library, London,
item SA/PHC/D2/3/2.
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521playground,self-developmentrooms,afarm,acafeteria,andhallsforthepurposeofdances,
lectures, concerts and theatre were provided to facilitate the health and leisure pursuits of
members. However, all these activities also enabled a staff of biologist-observers to accu-
mulate knowledge about the “natural” behaviour of families. Peckham, therefore, operated
ontwolevels.Foritsmembers itservedasacommunitycentrefacilitatingfamilyhealth,but
for the staff it operated as a laboratory for the study of human ethology.
From 1935 the Centre occupied a purpose-built building designed by the British archi-
tect Evan Owen Williams to embody the holistic, organic, and relational ethos of the
Peckham philosophy. The architectural design prioritized the principles of freedom of
access and visibility so as to enable family members to behave “naturally”, whilst allow-
ing unbroken surveillance of their activities. The building itself was expected to evolve
as emerging knowledge of the needs of the inhabitants obliged the alteration of the phy-
sical environment in order to better facilitate their needs. Consequently, the structure of
the building had to be flexible, and so it was built using light materials that allowed for
future alteration. The Architectural Review celebrated the novel construction in which
“the function of each part ...was quite clearly subsidiary to the function of the whole”,
making the building “architecturally alive” and allowing “no crudity of execution [to]
destroy that vitality, any more than elaborate consideration of detail can bring a dead
building to life”.
40 Far from using aggrandizing rhetoric, the Review correctly detected
that the physicality of the building was orientated towards facilitating the “natural” beha-
viour of its occupants to an unprecedented degree. For example, space had been allocated
according to the purpose of the activity that was intended to occur within it. In areas pro-
vided to facilitate self-determination in movement, where social activity was to be
encouraged (such as the recreation rooms) there was ample space, but in purely func-
tional areas (such as the entrance hall) space was kept to the minimum required to allow
for and guide movement. Open fireplaces existed in the study and recreation rooms not
because they were necessary, modern heating made them redundant, but for
“psychological reasons” to provide “a focal point around which social mixing is nat-
ural”.
41 This environment, designed to facilitate the “natural” behavioural needs of
families, was presumed equally to facilitate their healthy development.
It was here, in this human laboratory writ large, that Chance first encountered ethology
as director of the laboratory services that oversaw the recording of the physiological
characteristics of families. Recording an individual member’s physiology, including
blood sugar, blood haemoglobin, and blood pressure, formed part of the annual family
“health overhauls”, which exemplified the distinctive Peckham approach focused upon
the health of the whole, yet with an eye to the individual.
42 Biochemical tests formed
only a part of the consultation, close observation of inter- and intra-social interaction
of the family within the wider social milieu of the Centre was equally important.
Disease, after all, was thought to emerge from disjunctions in social health, in the synth-
esis of individual and environmental interaction within a social whole. The interrelation
of sociological and biological factors within a dynamic, relational, and process orientated
40J M Richards, ‘The Pioneer Health Centre: the
idea behind the idea’, Archit. Rev., 1935, 77: 203–16,
p. 208.
41Ibid., p. 209.
42Pearse and Scott Williamson, op. cit., note 33
above, p. 48.
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522understanding of health was to form the basis of Chance’s future understanding of beha-
viour, both human and animal. This linkage of the physiological and social also provided
the basis of his claim that the physiological uniformity of a laboratory animal could
be controlled only by managing social relations. In this regard, it is of note that Scott
Williamson claimed to have been inspired to pursue the study of health in 1912
when he began working with a friend on the infectivity of airborne tubercle bacilli. Scott
Williamson observed laboratory rats to be unusually resistant to infection until it was
found that separating family units caused the rats to succumb. The suggestion that social
conditions directly affected physiological health, and, moreover, that the maintenance of a
“family unit” was an important promoter of health, led to the Pioneer Health Centre as a
means for Scott Williamson “to get the human animals into my cage so that I could
observe them and experiment with them”.
43 Ironically, then, Chance’s passage through
Peckham saw him absorb a philosophy of human health and a set of material practices
that originated from observations of laboratory rats to which he was later to reapply them.
Despite the Centre having a developed epistemology grounded in the holist under-
standing of health as an evolving process emerging from synthetic relationships between
individuals and their social and physical environments, the Peckham approach was criti-
cized for lacking a rigorous scientific methodology. Like the later work of Tinbergen and
Lorenz, ethology at Peckham stumbled on the question of how to observe behaviour in
its natural environment without prejudicing the naturalness of that behaviour in the
act of observing. The solution adopted at Peckham was for the observers to be integrated
within the social and physical environment, becoming active participants. Such biologist-
participant-observers were known as “bionomists” and their work was “human
ethology”.
44 Bionomics was first coined in 1888 with relation to “the branch of biology
which deals with the mode of life of organisms in their natural habitat, their adaptation to
surroundings”.
45 Yet, in a similar way to ethology, the word “bionomics” had largely
been ignored in favour of the word “ecology”; the 1948 Encyclopaedia Britannica
described it as “the study of an organism in relation to its environment” and related it
to ecology and zoology.
46 Whilst Scott Williamson’s ethology was eclipsed by the emer-
ging field of animal behavioural work, bionomics remained a niche term that Chance
later attempted to adopt and redefine in his work on laboratory animals. In this, Chance
himself pioneered a new approach to laboratory animals with lasting consequences,
which, as yet, has remained unexamined by historians.
Bionomics, an Instrumental Ethology
In Birmingham, Chance incorporated his Peckham experience with his work on
laboratory animals and supplemented it with the growing literature on animal ethology.
In 1947 he explored how temperature influenced the degree of mutual excitement
43G Scott Williamson, ‘Health centres: a lecture
given to the Town and Country Planning
Association’, Nursing Times, 1946, 39: 64–5, p. 64.
44I H Pearse, The quality of life: the Peckham
approach to human ethology, Edinburgh, Scottish
Academic Press, 1979, pp. 151–2.
45Oxford English Dictionary.
46Anon., ‘Bionomics’ Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948, vol. 3,
p. 621.
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523experienced by benzedrinized mice, determined that the intensity of light had no obvious
effect, and ascertained that the presence of intermittent sounds significantly increased the
toxicity of amphetamine.
47 By the early 1950s Chance held a consolidated view that ani-
mal variance itself was variable in relation to the social and physical environment,
implying the need to find ideal environments where animal uniformity would be maxi-
mized. In widening his investigations to encompass the role of the physical as well as
social environment, he anticipated a similar move by Tinbergen, whose work was
increasingly to influence Chance as the decade progressed. Yet distinctive to Chance’s
construction of ethology was the degree to which it was determined by purpose, the
study of laboratory animals being tied to their standardization for the purpose of reliable
experimental design. Chance argued that genetic and pathogenic standardization of
laboratory animals could only be partially successful in producing reliable laboratory
animals, as the social and physical environment was equally if not more important in
determining their physiological reactions.
48 Only if the “natural” behaviour of laboratory
animals was understood, and their needs provided for, could the uniformity of laboratory
animals be guaranteed. Ethology, in a specific and instrumentally orientated form, could
provide this knowledge. By the mid-1950s Chance had a well developed programme of
instrumental ethology which he named bionomics in an (unacknowledged) echo of the
Pioneer Health Centre.
49 The application of ethology to the study of the needs of labora-
tory animals was to be the inaugural bionomic study.
The laboratory-centred focus and instrumental orientation make Chance’s work repre-
sentative of a distinct tradition of ethology that has yet to attract historical attention. Bio-
nomics might easily be described as “applied” ethology, its purpose being to identify the
natural behavioural needs of animals which, when understood, could be used to improve
the ways and means by which humans used animals for their own ends. The ethological
study of laboratory animals in order to standardize their properties and reconstruct them
as reliable laboratory tools was intended as a “proof of concept” project opening up a
new field of bionomic ethology. The project crystallized in 1955 as a proposal passed
to Solly Zuckerman (then professor of anatomy at the University of Birmingham) for
assessment.
50 Chance argued that a “bionomics laboratory” was necessary within the
department of pharmacology to explore the “economy of the animal” and develop tech-
niques to maximize its efficient utilization.
51 The production of standardized laboratory
animals was taken as an example where failure to consider the role of the environment
had led to the adoption of uneconomic and potentially unnecessary practices such as
47M R A Chance, ‘Factors influencing the
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J. Pharmacol., 1947, 89: 289–96.
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June 1955, file SZ/BU/9/5, Zuckerman Archive,
University of East Anglia, UK (hereafter ZA). Chance
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50For Zuckerman, see P L Krohn, ‘Solly
Zuckerman Baron Zuckerman, of Burnham Thorpe,
OM, KCB’, Biog. Mem. Fellows R. Soc., 1995, 41:
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51M R A Chance, ‘Bionomics laboratory in the
department of pharmacology, Medical School,
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524inbreeding. Bionomic analysis would identify the relatively small and easily overlooked
environmental changes that caused disproportionate variance in common laboratory ani-
mals with emphasis laid upon the role of temperature, humidity, lighting, sound, nutri-
tion, social interaction, the physical living space, and “natural behaviour”.
52 Until this
point the “natural” behaviour of laboratory animals had barely been recognized as a cate-
gory, certainly it was of little or no concern to ethologists of the Lorenz–Tinbergen
school, who constructed their science in opposition to laboratory based studies.
53 Lorenz
was particularly vociferous on this issue, characterizing ethology against the methodolo-
gical mistakes made by behaviourists and comparative psychologists. The latter he cas-
tigated for focusing upon a single species (the rat) and presuming that natural
behaviour could be understood through the experimental study of laboratory animals.
54
Lorenz was famously committed to the concept that domestication necessarily brought
about the degeneration of natural behaviour, an opinion he retained despite its resonance
with Nazi ideologies with which his own name was all too often connected.
55 In pursuing
ethology in the laboratory for instrumental ends, and in recognizing domesticated labora-
tory animals as animals with natural needs, Chance’s ethology is distinguished from
what has hitherto been recognized by historians as ethology.
Chance saw bionomics as the route to identifying and then providing for the natural
(instinctual) needs of laboratory animals in order to produce a “normal”, physiologically
“uniform”, and thus “co-operative” laboratory animal that would in turn be both reliable
and economical. However, Zuckerman failed to see any merit in bionomics and the
laboratory was not to be. By the 1950s Zuckerman was a rising star of British science,
well connected professionally as well as socially and politically. His scientific name
had been established in the late 1920s by his lengthy study of the social structure
of primates, the analysis of which he undertook on the presumption that sexual physiol-
ogy originated and sustained social interaction.
56 Zuckerman’s involvement with the
field of endocrinology suggests that he had the capacity to recognize the importance of
Chance’s arguments on the need for standardized animals. Yet Zuckerman objected to
what he saw as a contradictory oscillation between the laboratory animal as both
object and subject of study. He complained that he was “not at all clear” about the pro-
posal as at one moment it was “concerned with the factors which modify bioassay
responses”, and the next “with the study of animals’ ‘natural’ behaviour in various
circumstances”.
57 Zuckerman accused Chance of being unable to decide between a phar-
macological investigation of how particular physiological responses were affected
by changes in the environment or an ethological study of how an animal’s behaviour
52Ibid., pp. 2–3.
53See J R Durant, ‘Innate character in animal and
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C Webster, Biology, medicine and society, Cambridge
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54For example, K Lorenz, ‘The comparative
method in studying innate behaviour patterns’, in
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(symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology),
Cambridge University Press, 1950, pp. 221–68.
55See Burkhardt, op. cit., note 1 above, esp.
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525changed in nature.
58 The fact that Zuckerman carefully placed the word natural in
the term natural behaviour in quotation marks signified an important distinction in
how he, as opposed to Chance, understood the ontology of the laboratory animal. For
Zuckerman the laboratory animal was distinct from what it may have been in the wild,
distinct in that it was no longer dignified with natural behaviours akin to its wild ances-
tor. Moreover, reference to natural behavioural needs threatened to undermine the status
of the laboratory animal as a technical object, a tool, used to achieve specific ends. In
contrast, Chance believed laboratory animals remained imbued with behavioural needs,
albeit distinct from those they may have had in the wild, but nevertheless natural for
an animal whose natural environment was the laboratory. If these needs were not recog-
nized and met, then animals would fail in the work they were put to in the laboratory. It
is likely that Zuckerman and Chance’s positions were closer than either recognized, the
miscommunication arising in part from Zuckerman’s erroneous presumption that Chance
sought to examine animals in the wild. Chance disputed Zuckerman’s reading, arguing
that the laboratory animal was a subject with history, individuality and nature, all of
which had to be understood and managed if the animal was to be experimentally reliable
and economically utilized. Ethology, Chance argued, had yet to be applied to instrumen-
tal ends, and a “major effort in this direction” was desirable not only to guarantee the
reliability of animal dependent science but to ensure that new knowledge of animal beha-
viour produced by ethology was employed to its full potential.
59 Zuckerman remained
sceptical, blocking the university from providing any support, arguing:
We all know that an indefinable number of factors govern the responses of laboratory animals, and
for that reason we discipline ourselves by a variety of procedures which have been evolved mainly
through bitter experience. I have no doubt that the situation is far from ideal, but should not think
that its existence makes it “sufficiently clear” that what we want is a comprehensive study of envir-
onmental factors ...I should not support any attempt to stimulate studies on animal behaviour on
the score that doing so will improve bioassays.
60
His defence of individual “bitter experience” against a standardized methodology
placed Zuckerman outside the mainstream currents of animal-dependent science of this
time. Given his status and position it is improbable that he was unaware of the national
effort to standardize the production and use of laboratory animals emerging from the
1940s.
61 Moreover, the fact that Zuckerman’s own science was grounded in a faith in
experiment guaranteeing the universality of scientific knowledge, his objection to a stan-
dardized approach to the problem of animal variation requires explanation.
In fact, Zuckerman’s position is consistent in that his conviction that experiment alone
guaranteed scientific knowledge had led him to reject ethology as a viable science.
62
He viewed ethology as a return to the anthropomorphic and anecdotal approach to
animal behaviour which he thoroughly rejected in his 1932 study of the social structure
58‘Comments on Chance’s proposals’, dated
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63 Zuckerman was not alone in harbouring such suspicions, although he was
particularly active in vocalizing them. One might read the whole of Tinbergen’s work of
the 1950s as an attempt to establish ethology as a science against those who critiqued it
for relying upon subjective methodology. This is particularly evident in Tinbergen’s
meticulous avoidance of animal mentality so as to evade accusations of anthropomorph-
ism.
64 Nevertheless, Tinbergen was aware that the claims of many ethological studies
were based on subjective observations that could not be proved by replication, particu-
larly those of Lorenz. This has led one biographer to describe Tinbergen as being the
one who “turned ideas into science”.
65 Despite Tinbergen’s drive toward objectivity,
ethology remained associated, for many, with subjective relationships and speculative
claims. Consequently, and regardless of Tinbergen’s assertion that ethology was the
“biological study of behaviour”, a precise definition for ethology proved difficult to
come by.
66 The only unique methodological characteristic to those outside (and many
inside) the field was an indefinable je ne sais quoi in the relationship between ethologist
and animal.
67 For example, in 1957 William S Verplanck could describe an ethologist
only as “a behaviourist who likes his animals”.
68 Some, notably Lorenz, celebrated
this characteristic, claiming ethology’s methodological success derived from being
“emotionally involved” with one’s animals to the point of “falling in love”.
69 Chance
was no different in this respect and is remembered for having an enthusiasm for animals
that fascinated his colleagues.
70 Nevertheless, establishing the authority of ethological
knowledge upon personal expertise and subjective relationships made ethologists experts
of a peculiar kind. The exclusivity of ethology’s methodology did not make for an amic-
able relationship with established “scientific” approaches to animal behaviour. This is
reflected in the fact that reputable journals such as Nature were willing to debate whether
ethology was a respectable science at all.
71
For Zuckerman and others the answer was no. Ethology was anecdotal and anthropo-
morphic, and masqueraded as science. Ethology threatened to return to science aspects of
nineteenth-century studies of animal behaviour that Zuckerman had personally sought to
eradicate. For Zuckerman scientific methodology demanded that “animals have only
objective existence”.
72 In particular, he would not tolerate the ethological tendency to
read from animal to human behaviour.
73 He did not deny that the difference between ani-
mal and human was one of degree, but he felt that the immensity of that degree was often
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527disregarded by ethologists who inclined toward anthropomorphic explanations.
74
Zuckerman therefore would have been predisposed to reject Chance’s bionomic labora-
tory on the grounds of its ethological methodology. This disposition can only have been
reinforced by Chance’s wider ethological work, part of which involved the reworking of
Zuckerman’s conclusions on primate social behaviour.
75 Prior to 1955 Chance’s primate
studies had on the whole reinforced Zuckerman’s earlier thesis that sexual attraction was
the fundamental bond in primate society.
76 However, from 1956 Chance diverged from
this view, arguing that threat and aggression were the structuring factors of society.
This proved a fundamental shift in Chance’s thought that increasingly shaped his inves-
tigations of social structure. At the same time it led to a growing sense of acrimony
with Zuckerman. In 1958, at the fifteenth meeting of the International Congress of Zool-
ogy, Zuckerman relentlessly dissected Chance, even when Chance was merely asking
another speaker a question.
77 At another juncture, Zuckerman denied that his work in
any way implied the need for comparative analysis such as that undertaken by Chance.
Finally, he challenged Chance to explain fully why “the advent of ethology provides a
theory which allows one to link the behaviour of man to that of the rest of the animal
kingdom”.
78 Regrettably Chance’s replies are unrecorded; but these episodes suggest
that Zuckerman was indeed predisposed towards dismissing Chance on the grounds of
his ethological methodology. Zuckerman’s unassailable influence ensured the university
rejected the proposal for a bionomic laboratory. Chance was thereby forced to seek out-
side support in order to pursue this research. Ironically, it was the subjective relationship
that Zuckerman so reviled, conjoined with the Peckham association between environ-
ment and health, which secured the necessary funding for Chance to continue the etho-
logical study of laboratory animals.
Ethology and the Welfare of Laboratory Animals
Chance found support for the ethological study of laboratory animals from the Univer-
sities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW), a small self-consciously “scientific” ani-
mal welfare society. Established in 1926 by Charles Hume, UFAW provided a forum for
those with scientific expertise to act towards bettering the welfare of animals without
fear of involvement with antivivisectionism. UFAW’s constitution had forbidden the dis-
cussion of vivisection until 1942 when Hume sought to utilize its scientific credentials to
improve laboratory animal welfare. He combined being a committed High Anglican with
active participation in organizations such as the British Science Guild and the Associa-
tion of Scientific Workers (AScW), the latter of which began a campaign in the 1940s
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528(co-ordinated by Chance’s colleague Bacharach) to improve the quantity and quality of
laboratory animals available to British science.
79 Through the AScW Hume recognized
that the fear of low quality laboratory animals undermining the reliability of British
science offered UFAW an opportunity to intervene on the subject of laboratory animal
welfare. In 1947 UFAW appropriated the demand for standardized laboratory animals
to forward its own agenda with the publication of The UFAW handbook on the care
and management of laboratory animals. One of the first general guides to offer standar-
dized practices for laboratory animal management, the UFAW handbook was immensely
successful as a “standard” reference work.
80 The historical importance of this book lay in
the amalgamation of practices of standardization with the promotion of animal welfare.
It deployed welfare for instrumental ends to produce, as Bacharach put it in the pages of
the British Medical Journal, “a very practical blend of economics and
humanitarianism”.
81 The philosophy of the UFAW handbook compounded economics
and ethics within material practices demonstrating that:
in the long run it pays to be kind to animals ...you can ...get with healthy contented animals
more information from the same number, or the same amount of information from a smaller number,
than you can from sick or miserable animals.
82
This amalgamation of economics and humanitarianism, filtered through the Peckham
approach to health and environment, allowed Chance to recast bionomics (the study of
“animal economy”) as a programme to find the best environment to promote the health,
welfare and efficacy of laboratory animals. Bionomics as a name was dropped in favour
of welfare, but there was no alteration in the aims and practices of the work. The etho-
logical study of laboratory animals remained instrumental in focus, but became
embedded within a discourse that seamlessly integrated scientific reliability and eco-
nomic efficacy with that of animal welfare.
Chance may have encountered UFAW through the UFAW handbook, or via Bacharach,
who joined the organization in the 1950s, or possibly through Alistair Worden, who was
a long-time member, edited the UFAW handbook, and would have known Chance’s work
from editing the journal Animal Behaviour.
83 Whatever the case, in late 1955 UFAW
awarded Chance a financial grant “in the hope that his work will lead to a substantial
lessening of the number of animals required in certain bio-assays”.
84 The announcement
in the Lancet instigated a series of letters that echoed Zuckerman’s prior criticisms.
The psychologist R H J Watson (University College London) objected to the claim
that Chance’s work “inaugurates a long-overdue study of the psychology of laboratory
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529animals” as this claim ignored the “considerable volume of work” by comparative psy-
chologists.
85 Like Zuckerman, Watson had misunderstood the subtlety of Chance’s
approach. Hume responded:
What UFAW is inaugurating is a study, for the benefit of the animals themselves, of their psychol-
ogy under the conditions which laboratory conventions have provided for them but which may, for
all that is at present known, be far from optimal from the animals’ point of view ...In the course of
an assay on which the weight of the ovaries was the criterion, Chance found that when female rats
were solitary in their cages the results showed an enormous variance, whereas when each rat had
one female cage-mate a sensational reduction in variance was obtained. Could all Munn’s army of
mazologists have predicted this curious psychosomatic effect? It may well turn out to be only one
of a number of hitherto unnoticed factors affecting the mental comfort of laboratory animals.
86
Hume’s response indicates Watson’s criticism was motivated by inter-disciplinary
conflict resulting from ethology’s challenge to the laboratory based methodology of
behaviourists and comparative psychologists. Those more favourable to ethology, such
as the Cambridge based psychologist O L Zangwill, wrote to welcome UFAW’s sponsor-
ship of Chance.
87 The dispute in the Lancet, like Zuckerman’s criticism before it,
focused on the credibility of ethological methodology and the purpose to which it was
to be put. This illustrates the resistance to ethology in some quarters, as well the novelty
of Chance’s approach. Notably, there was no objection to the economic thrust of the pro-
ject, or to the involvement of UFAW and the consequent amalgamation of experimental,
economic, and welfare considerations.
UFAW hoped Chance would establish that “unlike test tubes, laboratory animals
(including the humble mice) have minds and feelings as well as bodies”.
88 UFAW’s
sponsorship of Chance formed part of a wider project to develop “humane experimental
technique” which produced the approach to laboratory animal use known as the “3Rs”.
These were the refinement of experimental technique so as to minimize suffering, the
reduction of the number of animals used in a given experiment, and the replacement
of sentient animals wherever possible by technical innovation. The 3Rs are convention-
ally associated with the publication of The principles of humane experimental technique
by W M S Russell and R L Burch in 1959.
89 This book was the product of a research
project funded by UFAW and is best seen as the codification and extension of the
organization’s agenda to promote the welfare of laboratory animals. Its principle author,
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530William Moys Stratton Russell (the son of the marine biologist Sir Frederick Stratton
Russell) was an Oxford trained zoologist strongly influenced by Tinbergen’s ethological
method. Russell’s development of the 3Rs as principles of “human experimental tech-
nique” was also influenced by Chance’s work, and as a consequence the two became
lifelong friends, sharing interests in the study of human and animal behaviour. Arguably,
the main legacy of Chance’s work was in anticipating and thereby shaping the develop-
ment of the refinement of experimental animal use.
90 Today the 3Rs form the basis of
ethical approaches to animal experiment throughout the world.
The 3Rs were first publicly articulated on 8 May 1957 at a joint symposium on
humane technique in the laboratory organized by UFAW and the Medical Research
Council’s Laboratory Animals Bureau. Chance was a participant at this symposium, pre-
senting a paper on the contribution of the environment to laboratory animal uniformity.
91
Reflecting both the work of Russell, and the philosophy of UFAW, Chance described
how the equivalence of health and happiness with “normal” and “uniform” physiology
made the material practices of promoting laboratory animal welfare inseparable from
the promotion of experimental reliability. However, he lamented the simplistic approach
of many to laboratory animals:
One gets the impression ...discussing these matters with biochemists, pharmacologists, and other
workers in the sciences ancillary to medicine that humidity is important to control lest the animals
tend to dry up, rather than that the alterations in the physiology which may be made necessary by
too humid or too arid an atmosphere are themselves factors which will distort the animal’s
response to drugs or various experimental practices.
92
In the 1960s physical environmental factors such as cage design, temperature, sound,
and lighting, as well as the social relations of laboratory animals, became established as
new territories of intervention. In this regard, cage design was a particular focus of the
work undertaken by Chance, with emphasis shifting from convenience to human user
to the “happiness of the cages’ inhabitants”.
93 In 1963 Chance obtained his laboratory,
named after his benefactors. The UFAW Environmental Research Unit (Humane Experi-
mental Technique) was inaugurated at the University of Birmingham with a symposium
on the design of laboratory animal caging.
94 By advocating the instrumental necessity of
providing a “happy home life” for laboratory animals, Chance promoted a subjective
understanding of laboratory animals which encompassed a consideration of their physio-
logical and psychological needs. The symposium placed emphasis upon the importance
of meeting animal needs as much as, if not more than, those of the human user. This con-
trasted with conventional approaches to experimental design, as a result of which, after
decades of working with rats, science still did “not know how to treat a rat, for example,
to put him on his best behaviour for the test in hand”.
95 The phrase “to put him on his
best behaviour” is indicative of Chance’s tendency to view the relationship between
90Emphasis on the design of environment to
meet the needs of the animal is now termed
“environmental enrichment”.
91M R A Chance, ‘The contribution of
environment to uniformity’, in Collected Papers –
Laboratory Animals Bureau, 1957, 6: 59–73.
92Ibid., p. 59.
93Bound Annual Reports, 1958, 32: 8, UFAW.
94Bound Annual Reports, 1957, 31: 4, UFAW.
95Chance, op. cit., note 91 above, p. 71.
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531experimenter and animal as one of co-operation. A further example can be seen in
Chance’s argument that, conventionally, experiments using rats:
have been carried out during the day-time, which is most convenient for ourselves but, as it hap-
pens, is in the middle of the “night” for the rat. Most laboratory procedures, therefore, involve
for a start, kicking the rat out of bed and then asking it to go through some fairly active proce-
dures.
96
From the “rats’ point of view” they spent their “day” in full activity running two to
three miles even in cage conditions and then spent their “night” being deprived of sleep
by curious experimenters. Such conditions, Chance contended, ensured only that labora-
tory animals displayed uncooperative and irrational behaviour. It made them poor
research objects, particularly when investigating drugs such as amphetamine which
directly impacted upon sleep and activity. Taking the animals’ point of view into consid-
eration suggested:
that a moderate degree of alertness will be found a necessary condition for bringing uniformity into
the behaviour of rats ...bioassay procedure will benefit from an amount of constraint sufficient to
call the attention of the rat to the matter at hand. Misunderstandings between rats and experimen-
ters would then be much fewer!
97
This language is strikingly anthropomorphic and echoes the ethos of the Pioneer
Health Centre. The focus on the relationship between experimenter and experimental
object, the emphasis upon the provision of the right environment, and the assumption
that the promotion of health and welfare would bring about a co-operative and pro-
ductive experimental subject mirrored the Peckham philosophy. When Chance subse-
quently installed reverse lighting into his laboratory (which for the rats made human
day night and human night day) the principle was similar to Scott Williamson’s
decision to install open fires to act as “a focal point around which social mixing is
natural”.
98
This movement from human to animal was not specific to Chance; after all the Pioneer
Health Centre began with Scott Williamson’s observations of laboratory rats. Others too
recognized the importance of the relationship between experimenter and laboratory ani-
mal at this time. Peter Medawar, a strong advocate but no practitioner of ethology,
described a “depth of obligation” whilst the physiologist E D Adrian identified it as
essential to the reliability of experimental science.
99 William Lane-Petter, director of
the MRC’s Laboratory Animals Bureau, understood this relationship as analogous to
the mutual obligation existent in the encounter between clinician and patient:
Veterinarians and paediatricians, whose patients normally possess uncomplicated mentalities, are
familiar with their ability to tolerate without distress lesions and manipulations that most human
adults would find insupportable; but they also know this tolerance can only be evoked if there is
96Ibid., p. 70.
97Ibid., p. 71.
98This was achieved by providing white light at
night and low level red light during the day to
simulate night.
99P B Medawar, ‘Foreword’, in Collected
Papers – Laboratory Animals Bureau, 1957, 6: 5–7,
p. 5; E D Adrian, ‘Experiments in the nervous
system’, Stephen Paget Memorial Lecture, 22
November 1950’, Conquest, 1951, 39: 2–14.
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532a satisfactory relationship between patient and clinician. The same is true of the experimental
animal.
100
The clinical analogy served to convey the increasing importance of the notion of co-
operation between experimenter and laboratory animal, and the consequent acknowl-
edgement of shared physical, psychological and social relationships. In this, ethology
was the principle vector through which scientific and moral necessity came to be inte-
grated within the material practice of the laboratory. As a result, ethology opened a
new relational territory wherein the subjectivity of laboratory animals could be recog-
nized.
Reference to clinical practice was more than analogy; clinical observation and narra-
tive description were implicit to these developing experimental practices and reflected
the wider growth in reflexive thinking of the time. There is little to distinguish Chance’s
methodological approach to laboratory animals from Scott Williamson’s approach to
human health (itself drawn from observations of laboratory animals). Both were
grounded in “ethology” and embodied a shared ethos and similar practices established
about non-interventionist observation and narrative description. Indeed, the same etholo-
gical practices Chance used to comprehend the behavioural needs of laboratory animals
he later deployed to understand the behavioural patterns of psychiatric patients.
101 For
Chance, ethology consisted of objective practices of observation and analysis that could
be applied equally to human or animal behaviour.
102 In being predicated upon evolution-
ary theory, ethology could not help but transgress the boundary between “human” and
“animal”, a characteristic particularly evident in Lorenz’s popular writings. In 1967 the
notion of a human–animal boundary was fundamentally challenged by Desmond
Morris’s bestseller The naked ape.
103 Morris was a student of Tinbergen in the 1950s
and a contemporary of Russell in the Department of Zoology at Oxford. He had
remained friends with his old tutor, who, late in his career, followed his student and
became convinced that ethology’s potential lay in its application to human behaviour.
104
For some, this was no more than “human bird watching”, but it was considered important
enough none the less for the MRC to invite Tinbergen to speak to them on the subject on
more than one occasion.
105
The ease with which ethology moved from the animal to the human is exemplified by
a course that Chance began to teach to medical students at Birmingham in the late 1960s.
100W Lane-Petter, ‘Humane vivisection’, The
Practitioner, 1963, 190: 81–4, p. 81.
101M R A Chance, ‘Ethological discoveries on
spacing and their relevance to psychiatry’,
University of Birmingham Faculty of Medicine and
Dentistry Bulletin, 1970, 27: 21–3; R H Polsky and
M R A Chance, ‘An ethological perspective on
social behaviour in long stay hospitalized
psychiatric patients’, J. Nerv. Mental Dis., 1979,
167: 658–68; R H Polsky and M R A Chance, ‘An
ethological analysis of long stay hospitalized
psychiatric patients. Senders and receivers in social
interaction’, J. Nerv. Mental Dis., 1979, 167:
669–74; R H Polsky and M R A Chance, ‘Social
interaction and the use of space on a ward of long
term psychiatric patients’, J. Nerv. Mental Dis.,
1980, 168: 550–5.
102M R A Chance, ‘How behaviour analysis
became possible’, MRAC.
103Desmond Morris, The naked ape, London,
Jonathan Cape, 1967.
104N Tinbergen, ‘On war and peace in animals
and man’, Science, 1968, 160: 1411–18. Russell, too,
believed this to be the case and had anticipated
Morris’s work, see C Russell and W M S Russell,
Human behaviour, London, Andre ´ Deutsch, 1961.
105For Tinbergen’s invitation to discuss “human
bird watching” with the MRC’s Clinical Psychiatry
Committee on 5 February 1962, see file FD 22 66 in
the MRC Archive, National Archives, Kew, UK.
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533Titled ‘How to observe’, the course was a response to an earlier investigation on the
capacity of medical students objectively to observe behaviour. Chance had assessed
the abilities of medical students to compare and describe the behaviour of pairs of rats,
in each case one normal and one having been dosed with a psychotherapeutic drug
thought to restrict certain behaviours and exaggerate others.
106 Chance found that what
the students decided to look for had little to do with what they looked at but rather
emerged from preconceived ideas drawn from existent medical knowledge and tradi-
tional terms for describing human behaviour. Outside of preconceived concepts (such
as “aggression”, “anxiety”, “intelligence”) students lacked the ability objectively to
describe observed behaviour, and in many cases failed to distinguish between drugged
and normal rats. Nor did they attempt to observe the rats’ “natural” behaviour, instead
they chose to produce behaviour by experimentally interfering. The fact that students
deferred to what they thought they knew rather than what was actually before them, in
Chance’s view, revealed serious deficiencies in the medical curriculum as then taught.
In clinical practice such tendencies produced “wasted effort”, as lines of investigation
based on false premises led to possibly tragic consequences. Accordingly, Chance devel-
oped a course to teach students not just what to observe but how to reflect upon the way
observational evidence is integrated with existing knowledge. Based on the practical
observation of the behavioural changes in rats dosed with various psychotherapeutic
drugs, the course was predicated upon the assumption that the observation of animal
and human behaviour, whether for the purpose of laboratory science or clinical medicine,
was grounded in the same practices.
107 In this way ethology provided a vector of com-
munication between the laboratory and the clinic, locations with systems of knowledge
and practices that have often been taken to be incommunicable by historians of science
and medicine.
108
Conclusion
Chance’s ethology re-introduced to the laboratory the animal as a subjective, feeling,
living being, and in doing so made explicit the subjective relationship between laboratory
animal and experimenter. This is evident in Chance’s articles published in pharmaceuti-
cal journals where the animal, its behavioural patterns and needs are brought to the fore.
Ethology’s introduction into the laboratory transformed the way laboratory animals were
represented, and anticipated a wider reconfiguration of the ways in which animals were
conceptualized, encountered, and used in laboratory science. Chance’s work contributed
to the opening up of a new territory of intervention for those concerned with the health,
welfare and management of laboratory animals. This territory was mapped by old and
106M R A Chance and D A Humphries, ‘Medical
student’s powers of observation’, Br. J. Med. Ed.,
1967, 1: 141–34.
107M R A Chance, ‘A class in the observation of
behaviour’, MRAC.
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Press, 1998, pp. 94–111; I Lo ¨wy and J P Gaudillie `re
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534new organizations such as UFAW, the MRC’s Laboratory Animal Bureau (established in
1947) and the Animal Technicians Association (established in 1949). It was codified in
new journals such as Collected Papers – Laboratory Animals Bureau, The Journal of the
Animal Technicians Association, and Laboratory Animals, as well as in monographs
including the UFAW handbook. Perhaps most importantly, ethology served as a vector
by which experimental and ethical necessity, the instrumental and the moral, could be
reconciled.
Burkhardt, in his definitive history of the Lorenz–Tinbergen approach to ethology,
argued that the “course of ethology’s development has been more responsive to contin-
gencies, more ‘ecological’ in its relations to the specific and diverse settings of its
ongoing construction and thus more interesting historically”.
109 In this sense Chance’s
work forms a historically unexplored example of ethology’s ecologies, an important
instance of the adaptability of ethology. Burkhardt’s biographical approach to the under-
standing of ethology, a model that is extended here to include Michael Chance, followed
Lorenz’s characterization of his and Tinbergen’s approaches to ethology. Lorenz, the
“farmer”, bred and raised the animals he studied, lived in close proximity to them, and
consequently knew almost instinctively normal and abnormal behaviours and was happy
to claim knowledge that rested on such subjective relationships. Tinbergen, “the hunter”,
tracked and observed animals in the wild, explored their adaptation to natural environ-
ments, focused on the development of a rigorous methodology, and was cautious about
the claims he made for ethological science. If we were to extend the metaphor to charac-
terize Chance, he would be the “worker”, conscious that domesticated animals retained
natural needs, and aware that they would necessarily be used for instrumental ends. He
developed methods to harmonize nature and purpose, life and productivity, to benefit
both. Pushing further to encompass Chance’s politics, a better metaphor would be the
“socialist worker”. The political context to Chance’s work was arguably Marx’s writing
on work and alienation. Marx, of course, did not have animals in mind when he wrote:
First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that
in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins
his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside
himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His
labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it’s forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction
of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.
110
None the less, Marx’s words resonate with Chance’s work. Chance himself did not
explicitly use the language of Marx. Yet he is not far in principle from the numerous
Marxist discussions about work and alienation present in post-war western culture, par-
ticularly in the literature on human industrial health.
111 Given Chance’s politics, his
109Burkhardt, op. cit, note 1 above, p. 13.
110K Marx, Economic and philosophic
manuscripts of 1844, New York, International
Publishers, 1964, p. 72, quoted in Bertell
Ollman, Alienation: Marx’s conception of man in
capitalist society, Cambridge University Press, 1971,
p. 137.
111The prevalence of alienation in post-Second
World War thought is attributed to the translation of
Marx’s so-called Economic and philosophical
manuscripts of 1844, see ‘Alienation’, in C D Kernig,
Marxism, Communism and western society, New
York, Herder and Herder, 1972, pp. 88–93, p. 90.
This is not to say that Marx’s thinking would have
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535growing pharmacological interest in toxicology, and his ethological analysis of the
psychiatric patient, it is probable that he was familiar with the strand of Marxist-
psychological literature which applied the concept of alienation to explain mental and
physical ill health in the modern worker.
112 Whether in the provision of health facilities
to the working class at Peckham, the understanding of fascism as a social pathology, or
in the production of the left wing periodical Labour Discussion Notes, Chance’s socialist
politics shaped his own productive activity including his approach to laboratory animals.
Certainly Marxist ideas of alienation resonate with Chance’s emphasis upon finding the
right relationships and the right environments to ensure a co-operative, healthy, produc-
tive and contented laboratory animal.
This paper has traced how ethology opened up a new territory in which the subject-
ivity of laboratory animals was recognized and brought to the fore in post-war biomedi-
cal science. The dynamic relationships which the animal shared with its environment
and, most importantly, the human researchers within that environment, consequently
became increasingly important considerations in laboratory science. Equally important
was the reflexive nature of ethological thought which made the relationship between
observer and observed methodologically prominent. In laboratory science this encour-
aged an explicit recognition of the importance of the mutual, intra-dependent relationship
between animal and human, experimental object and experimenter, which remained
instrumental but, none the less, increasingly emphasized co-operation and mutual obliga-
tion. Evidence for this can be found in the way Chance’s work was absorbed within the
wider agenda of UFAW to promote a humane approach to experimental technique. The
fact that Chance’s principles of environmental design were integrated within the work of
the MRC’s Laboratory Animal Centre equally underlines the point.
113 Commenting on
the work of Lorenz, Vinciane Despret has observed that with ethology the “practice of
knowing has become a practice of caring”.
114 So it was in the laboratory, where the
introduction of ethological modes of thought and practice placed a new emphasis upon
subjective social relationships, which in turn brought to the fore notions of mutual
responsibility and co-operation between human and animal. In this sense, the production
of reliable science could be said to have become dependent upon the production of a
responsible, and response-able, scientist.
115
suggested animals could suffer alienation—on the
contrary Marx denied animal consciousness arguing
that the “animal is one with its vital activity”. Whilst
it remains unclear to what extent Chance attributed
consciousness to animals, in proposing laboratory
animals were no longer one with their vital activity
Chance may have considered them “alienated” in
some sense.
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